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3Chapter 6. Philosophical Issues.
‘Philosophy’ today has come to mean the academic ideological disputes between 
various grandiose ‘meta-philosophies’, rather than the content or explanation of the 
real problems and issues. I illustrate typical expressions of the conventional ‘scientific 
anti-realist’ philosophy of time here, and show how far it has infiltrated the scientific 
world view.  
Physical Time: symmetry, irreversibility and physical 
directionality.
In the first part of this study, it was first shown that fundamental physics as we know 
it entails a deeply embedded intrinsic directionality of time, and is not time symmetric 
or reversible at all at the micro-physical level. It was shown that the irreversibility of 
quantum mechanics entails a law-like cause and explanation of thermodynamics and 
physical time directionality in our universe. In particular, the time reversal of our 
universe is not physically possible in any sense, as commonly claimed. ‘Contingent 
boundary conditions’ on the early universe are not required to derive the 
thermodynamic time asymmetry or explain the irreversibility of ordinary processes. 
This resolves long-standing problems about physical time asymmetry, reversibility 
and retrodiction, but it means the mechanistic theory served up as ‘the scientific view 
of time’ is fraught with analytic errors, explanatory failures, and metaphysical 
dogmas.
The initial error. 
If this is right, then we must wonder: how did the ‘conventional scientific-
philosophical account’ manage to get the analysis of time symmetry so wrong? It is 
not hard to see how in retrospect. It started from an initial error derived from false 
analogies between classical and quantum mechanics. The pioneers of the subject got 
one fundamental principle wrong early in the interpretation of quantum theory: the 
criterion for the time symmetry of probabilistic theories – applied to quantum 
4mechanics. Quantum mechanics (more or less) satisfies their chosen principle, but it is 
not the real criterion for time symmetry. 
This is only one principle – but reasoning is cumulative, and if a fundamental 
principle is wrong, reasoning down the chain of consequences is liable to be wrong as 
well. If we climb the wrong branch of a tree, we find ourselves stranded at a dead-
end, and we can never reach the top. To rejoin with the trunk, we have to climb back 
down from the tree branch, and start again. The initial false principle led to the false 
inference that quantum mechanics is time symmetric, and that real physical processes 
are consequently reversible. Then instead of correcting their mistakes when they had a 
chance, some fifty years ago - when Watanabe (1955) first pointed out the situation - 
the physicists ignored it, and the philosophers continued to build a theory on it. 
Once a false view of these two foundational questions became established by the 
1960’s – the twin fallacies that quantum mechanics is time symmetric and physical 
processes governed by thermodynamics are reversible – numerous secondary writers 
published accounts of this, science textbooks referred to it as a standard scientific 
result, philosophers published justifications and explanations and extended ramblings, 
and the ideology took on a momentum that was too big to stop. By 1980’s it was 
practically unacceptable to question it.
Since this initial error in the conventional account is the starting point for all these 
problems, I restate it here. The conventional accounts of time symmetry of quantum 
mechanics hold that a probabilistic theory is time symmetric (equivalently, reversible; 
time reversal invariant; TRI) if it satisfies the rule that:
[*] prob(s2(t+t)|s1(t)) = prob(Ts1(t+t)|Ts2(t))
But this is a false mirror: the real criterion for probabilistic time symmetry is:
[CPTS] prob(s2(t+t)|s1(t)) = prob(Ts2(t-t)|Ts1(t))
5Or in other words, the true reflection of the term: prob(s2(t+t)|s1(t)) with respect to 
time is the term: prob(Ts2(t- t)|Ts1(t)), and not the term: prob(Ts1(t+t)|Ts2(t)), as 
assumed throughout the literature. There is no doubt about this: it is mathematically 
proven, and Chapter 1 shows how easy it is to demonstrate that [*] is irrelevant to 
time symmetry. The principle [*] is logically independent of the [CPTS] and time 
symmetry. Quantum mechanics (more or less) satisfies [*], but it completely fails the 
[CPTS] and time symmetry. 
The most remarkable thing is that generations of specialist philosophers, still working 
in research programs to the present day, have failed to notice this. In fact, Watanabe, 
the best writer on the time symmetry of quantum physics in the C20th, and a pioneer 
of the analysis of time symmetry in quantum electrodynamics, did notice, and made 
strenuous efforts to bring it to attention; but his work has been misinterpreted, ignored 
and buried - initially under false objections by a few writers in the 1960’s. Leading 
writers on the subject today rarely make any reference to Watanabe, only to other 
secondary commentators. 
The need for proof of the criterion for probabilistic time symmetry.
The fact that so many specialists in the field have failed to notice this error for 
themselves reflects something quite remarkable and disturbing: no one in the main-
stream tradition has thought to try to prove that the conventional criterion is correct. 
If anyone competent in probability theory tried to prove their criterion, they should 
quickly realise it is wrong. Note that [*] is only a criterion applied to probabilistic 
theories, to try to capture the meaning of time symmetry. Time symmetry, or 
invariance under time reversal, is defined by the fundamental transformation that 
maps: T: t  -t. I.e. it exchanges the directions of time. But it has almost never 
occurred to anyone in C20th physics or philosophy (besides Watanabe) that a proof is 
needed to show that the criterion correctly captures time symmetry. This reflects two 
troubling attitudes among physicists. 
The first attitude is that the conventional criterion is intuitively obvious. Given the 
conclusion is wrong, this shows a fatal failure of intellectual vision. It reflects a more 
6general intellectual laziness of modern physicists when it comes to giving conceptual 
proofs and analyses of concepts that goes beyond mere equation-solving. This is not 
an isolated example: this intellectual laziness is rife. Physicists are very careful when 
working within a prescribed calculus in applied mathematics (differential equations, 
tensor calculus, etc), and deriving solutions to fixed equations. But when it comes to 
interpreting concepts and giving proofs of conceptual reasoning – as we have to do in 
philosophical logic or mathematical logic – they suddenly get very casual. They 
expect the pure mathematicians to do the detailed foundational work for them. 
We see this gung-ho attitude throughout the twentieth century debates about 
foundations of quantum mechanics. The concerns of ‘intuitive scientific realists’ like 
Planck, Lorentz, Einstein, Schrodinger, Bohm, Dirac – who worked to find precise 
interpretations of concepts - are casually dismissed by most physicists – “Just stick 
the boundary conditions into the equations and get the measurement predictions out” 
became the modern physicist’s credo. “Einstein just wasn’t as sophisticated at maths 
as us, he was an old-fashioned realist and didn’t realise that empirical results are the 
only thing that counts. Forget these guys, we know far more than they did.”
Unfortunately when physicists come to comment on conceptual issues, this attitude 
leads them into a vastly over-inflated sense of confidence, and they often jump to the 
first conclusions that make intuitive sense, instead of carefully formulating the 
concepts in a manner that exposes arguments to real requirements of proof and 
evidence. In reality, an education in modern physics simply does not provide the 
intellectual tools to deal with conceptual analysis, any more than it provides the tools 
to deal with political analysis or anthropological analysis or literary analysis. The 
failure is reflected by inadequacies the formal calculus of physics itself. It is shown in 
a later technical chapter that the ordinary calculus is inadequate to formally derive 
results about time symmetry (or other symmetries). A framework of intensional logic 
is required to formalise a language for empirical theories. Without it, critical proofs 
have to be conducted in an informal meta-language (natural language). The concept of 
intensional logic is unknown in physics. Mathematical languages are extensional, 
because they only need to deal with analytic truths, not empirical truths. 
7More generally, scientific conceptual reasoning involves counterfactual reasoning 
and abductive reasoning (inference to the best explanation). But no adequate 
counterfactual or abductive logic has ever been formalised. The idea that conceptual 
analysis can be done solely using the formal languages of conventional applied 
mathematics is based on ignorance about the foundations of logic itself. 
The reactionary defence of quantum time symmetry. 
The second attitude is a reactionary view that the choice of the orthodox criterion is 
just a convention for defining time symmetry. What about the fact that it fails to 
capture the symmetry transformation: T: t  -t? “Well it is simply an alternative 
definition of time symmetry, and the one that works for quantum mechanics.”  This 
attitude is the most common source of continuing denial that any error has been made 
in the conventional criterion. It is a classic example of neo-positivist reasoning. Neo-
positivism is characterised by its own special principles of reasoning, providing a set 
of defensive manoeuvres for circumventing criticism. This response goes like this:
 
(A) First, prior to any controversy, it is claimed that the conventional criterion for  
time symmetry is unchallengeable, having been objectively proven in physics, 
and anyone disputing it is considered an ignorant crank. 
(B) Attempts to publish critical proofs are initially rejected as cranky, but with 
persistence, some reviewers are persuaded that there is a case to be answered.
(C) When it finally sinks in that there is indeed a serious problem with the 
conventional analysis, it claimed that it all depends on ‘defining the meaning 
of time symmetry’, and angry defences of the conventional results are given 
on pragmatist grounds, without addressing the problem directly. 
(D) The correct definition of time symmetry is consistently circumvented. On this 
view, there is no objective analysis of time symmetry: the neo-positivists are 
intent on choosing a definition of time symmetry in the best way they can to 
render theories ‘reversible’ and maintain their doctrines. 
This is disingenuous to say the least. A physicist who could not correctly identify 
space reflection symmetry would not be considered competent. Why should 
8incompetence to correctly identify time reversal symmetry be any different? A 
physicist who taught that space reflection symmetry is defined by a transformation 
other than: R: r  -r and claimed that this is merely a ‘conventional definition’ would 
be ridiculed. Yet this is precisely the response when the neo-positivists are confronted 
with their own error in defining time reversal symmetry. Instead of accepting that 
time symmetry is objectively defined as invariance under the transformation: T: t  -
t, they go to extraordinary lengths to try to construct alternative definitions and 
arguments to retain their conventional account. Of course, they only do this when they 
discover their account is in error. If their account was correct in the first place, they 
would simply insist that time reversal is defined by the time reversal transformation.  
There is no doubt that the intended meaning of time reversal is uniquely defined by 
the transformation: t  -t.  All the physicists assume this before they recognise there 
might be a problem. And most importantly, all the critical consequences drawn by the 
philosophers from the claim that fundamental physics is reversible or time symmetric 
uniquely depend on this meaning. These include all the conventional dogmas: that 
physics reflects no intrinsic differences between the two directions of time, that 
physical processes could equally well all run backwards in time, and that there is no 
law-like explanation of directionality of ordinary physical processes. These all 
depend on the claim of invariance under the time reversal transformation: t  -t.  
These consequences do not follow from the symmetry claimed to represent the 
‘reversibility of quantum mechanics’. 
The false interpretation of time reversal in the literature. 
This initial mistake, i.e. the false interpretation of probabilistic time reversal 
symmetry, is rife throughout the literature. The false principle [*] seems to have been 
first applied in quantum mechanics by Lewis [1931], coming from a background in 
chemistry. For typical statements from the main-stream literature:
In specialist texts on the physics of time symmetry:
"The probability w [that a system at time t1 in a state |> is found at time t2 in a 
state |>] will be w = <|U(t2,t1)|>.  Now consider the reverse probability, wrev , 
9that a system at time t1 in a state K|> is found at time t2 in a state K|>. This will 
be wrev = <K†|U(tl2,t1)|K>. ... whence the principle of microreversibility w = 
wrev ... Symbolically [this] may be written prob() = prob(K) 
which should be compared with the classic principle [s1s2  Ts2 s1]." 
(Davies, 1974, p.157).
In quantum mechanics textbooks: 
“A system is said to exhibit symmetry under time reversal if, at least in principle, 
its time development may be reversed and all physical processes run backwards, 
with initial and final states interchanged. Symmetry between the two directions of 
motion in time implies that to every state  there corresponds a time-reversed 
state  and that the transformation  preserves the values of all probabilities, 
thus leaving invariant the absolute value of any scalar product between the two 
states.” Merzbacher, 1982, p.406-407
In specialist papers on the philosophy of time symmetry:
The laws L governing physical system {S} are said to be invariant under time 
reversal, or equivalently, the temporal processes of {S} are said to be nomically 
reversible if and only if (a) for any nomically possible states si and sf of  S{S}, 
Tsi and Tsf are also possible states of S and (b) if the laws L imply that whenever  
S{S} is in state si it is state sf after and interval of  then they also imply that 
whenever S is in state Tsf  it is in state Tsi after an interval ... If the equations of 
motion contain a stochastic term, then the present characterisation would have to 
be modified. The most obvious extension would be to require that the transition 
probability from si to sf equal the transition probability from Tsf to Tsi. (Earman, 
1969, p.281).
“A theory is TRI [time reversal invariant] just in case given a lawful sequence of 
states of a system from an initial state Si to final state Sf with chance equal to r, the 
sequence from the temporally reflected final state SfT to the temporally reflected 
initial state SiT, also has chance equal to r, i.e, P(Si  Sf) = P(SfT  SiT).” 
(Callender, 2002, “Is time handed in a quantum world”, < http://philsci-
archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/612>)
In introductions to the philosophy of physics:
If the laws of nature are time-reversal invariant, then for any process that occurs in 
the world, the process that consists in starting with the time reversed final state of 
the original evolution and ending up with the time-reversed initial state of the 
original process is equally compossible with the laws of nature... Remember, of 
course, that in quantum-theoretic context, it is the transition probabilities between 
reversed states which must equal the probabilities of the unreversed states taken in 
opposite temporal order for the laws to be time-reversal invariant. The physics of 
time reversal invariance, then, is quite simple. (Sklarr, 1974, p. 368).
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It is interesting that there is no explicit acknowledgement that the criterion [*] is 
false, and leading writers now avoid formally stating what time symmetry means for 
probabilistic theories. Miller  (2009)  cites Holster (2003) with the observation that: 
“There is not universal consensus on the meaning of time-symmetry either in 
classical physics or in quantum physics (for recent discussions and references to 
the literature, see [Malament, 2004]  and [Holster, 2003] respectively). The 
orthodox position is that a system is time symmetric if it satisfies motion reversal 
invariance [Wigner 1959, Sachs 1987]  and that is the meaning which will be 
adopted in the following.”
Which is to say, Miller simply chooses to adopt the ‘orthodox meaning of time 
reversal’, without bothering with the question of whether it is correct or not. The more  
defensive reaction however is to continue with attempts to try to prove the time 
symmetry of quantum mechanics, as illustrated by Roberts (2012), a recent graduate 
student of Earman, who starts his PhD dissertation with: 
“This dissertation is about the sense in which the laws of quantum theory 
distinguish between the past and the future. I begin with an account of what it 
means for quantum theory to make such a distinction, by providing a novel 
derivation of the meaning of time reversal."
“The philosophy of physics often engages in [the] problem of clarifying the 
meaning of a central term appearing in the foundation of a theory. One resilient 
example for both physicists and philosophers is the term, “time reversal." Unlike a 
transformation like rotation or translation in space, there is no apparent physical 
act that would exchange the past and the future. … Although Malament's (2004) 
example has spawned considerable discussion among philosophers, nobody has 
yet pursued the question of how this kind of question can be answered in a theory 
like quantum mechanics. That is the problem that I aim to solve in Chapter 2.” 
(Roberts, 2012). 
The claim to “provide a novel derivation of the meaning of time reversal” should 
immediately set off alarm bells. Remarkably, Roberts never defines time reversal in 
terms of the time reversal transformation T: t-t throughout the entire PhD thesis! 
(The same is true of all the recent technical papers by the neo-positivists that claim to 
‘define’ time reversal in quantum mechanics: they no longer define it as the t  -t 
transformation.) Roberts goes on to develop ‘novel definitions of the meaning of time 
reversal in quantum mechanics’ (yikes!) with the intention of proving quantum 
mechanics is reversible. He follows the lead of his mentor, Earman (2002), of seeing 
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the problem as redefining time reversal to defend the claim that quantum theory is 
time symmetric. His claim that ‘no one has yet pursued the question of how this kind 
of question can be answered in a theory like quantum mechanics’ shows a remarkable 
ignorance of work in the field. But remarkably, too, Roberts never states any 
definition or condition for the time reversal of probabilistic laws – and never 
considers quantum mechanics as a probabilistic theory! – despite the fact that this is 
what exposes the striking time-asymmetric feature of the theory. 
Ramifications of the initial error in the explanation of time directed 
processes. 
The ramifications of this initial error are huge. Using the mistaken criterion for 
probabilistic time symmetry, quantum mechanics, along with ‘all other theories of 
physics’, are claimed to be time symmetric. (Note the criterion must be applied to 
thermodynamics as well as quantum mechanics.) The impact of this error on the 
subsequent interpretation is rife throughout the primary and secondary literature, e.g. 
"We must dismiss the suggestion that the asymmetry lies in the laws of physics. 
The laws of classical dynamics and electromagnetism, as well as quantum 
mechanics, are all expressed in time symmetric differential equations. In other 
words, if f(t) is a solution to these equations, so is f(-t)... " (Smart, 'Time', in The 
Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, Vol 8, p.126.)
"How is it possible to account for the difference between past and future when an 
examination of the laws of physics reveals only the symmetry of time? Scarcely 
any topic in fundamental physics can avoid running up against this problem at 
some stage; and yet after more than a century of speculation, occupying the 
attention of some of the world's greatest physicists, the question seems far from 
answered. ... A casual inspection of the literature creates the impression of great 
confusion and misunderstanding surrounding the topic." (P.C.W. Davies, 1974, 
p.1.)
"These three examples indicate what is, with one exception [K-mesons], a 
remarkable fundamental fact of nature: all known laws of physics are invariant 
under time reversal. ...Although we are forced to conclude that the laws of physics 
do not themselves provide a time asymmetry, it is one of the most fundamental 
aspects of our experience that, as a matter of fact, the world is asymmetric in time. 
This is sometimes expressed by saying that the temporal asymmetry is 'fact-like' 
rather than 'law-like'... This means that symmetric behaviour is observed as a 
result of the natural selection of certain types of special boundary conditions  in 
preference to others." (P.C.W. Davies 1975, p.26-27). 
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"The laws of science do not distinguish between the past and the future. " 
(Hawking 1988, p.144).
"It is, however, remarkable that the laws of physics have all been found to be quite 
symmetrical with respect to the sense of time. " (Gold, 1962, p. 403).
"Both the thermodynamic and the non-thermodynamic species of irreversibility 
which we shall find to obtain are de facto or nomologically contingent in 
character." (Grunbaum, 1972, p. 219).
"This essay is a philosophical evaluation of the findings of Wald and Penrose in 
which they claim to have supported an arrow (or the irreversibility) of time in 
quantum gravity. ... My conclusion is that the arrow of time found in quantum 
gravity is at best de facto (nonlawlike)." (Liu, 1993, p.619).
"Certainly, our fundamental physical theories do not incorporate a time bias. Even 
the notoriously irreversible phenomena of thermodynamics - processes of entropy 
increase which are typically associated with time's arrow - can, as we shall see in 
the next chapter, be reconciled with the isotropy of time. True, there is a difficulty 
with quantum mechanics. On some interpretations, measurement is treated as a 
basic irreversible phenomenon. However, the problems of how to make sense of 
the formal theory are themselves still so gigantic and intractable that no 
implications may yet be drawn from quantum mechanics regarding the anisotropy 
of time. " (Horwich, 1987, p.55)
“The arrow of time expresses the fact that in the world about us the past is 
distinctly different from the future. Milk spills but doesn't unspill; eggs splatter 
but do not unsplatter; waves break but do not unbreak; we always grow older, 
never younger. These processes all move in one direction in time - they are called 
"time-irreversible" and define the arrow of time. It is therefore very surprising that 
the relevant fundamental laws of nature make no such distinction between the past 
and the future. This in turn leads to a great puzzle - if the laws of nature permit all 
processes to be run backwards in time, why don't we observe them doing so?” 
(Joel L. Lebowitz (2008), Scholarpedia, 3(4):3448. URL: 
<http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Time's_arrow_and_Boltzmann's_entropy>)
It can be seen that there is little reserve in the literature about stating the universal 
validity of time symmetry in physics. Horwich is admittedly self-contradictory -  
stating first that “fundamental theories do not incorporate a time bias”, and then 
claiming that quantum mechanics cannot even be analysed – but he is wrong: 
quantum mechanics is irreversible, whatever interpretation is taken of quantum 
measurement. It is irreversible because its probabilistic laws are irreversible. 
Quantum probabilities are a defining feature of the theory. Even if a deeper theory is 
discovered that explains these probability laws, e.g. by deterministic underlying 
variables, the probabilistic laws of quantum mechanics will still be irreversible. 
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The reactionary view of thermodynamic reversibility. 
Not all writers are unaware of this problem, but want to maintain the status quo of the 
conventional theory. Callender performs some awkward contortions to suppress the 
possibility that the time asymmetry of quantum mechanics might explain the physical 
directionality reflected in thermodynamics. Like Roberts and Earman, he does this by 
focussing on the deterministic evolution of the quantum mechanical wave function 
(which is claimed to be reversible, but is effectively unobservable), and ignoring the 
heart of the empirical theory, viz. its probabilistic laws. His article in The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy tells us: 
“Thermodynamics is the science that describes much of the time-asymmetric 
behavior found in the world. This entry's first task, consequently, is to show how 
thermodynamics treats temporally ‘directed’ behavior. It then concentrates on the 
following two questions. (1) What is the origin of the thermodynamic asymmetry 
in time? In a world possibly governed by time-symmetric laws, how should we 
understand the time-asymmetric laws of thermodynamics? (2) Does the 
thermodynamic time asymmetry explain the other temporal asymmetries?” … 
“To the best of our knowledge, our world is fundamentally quantum mechanical, 
not classical mechanical. Does this change the situation? … Modulo some 
philosophical concerns about the meaning of time reversal (Albert 2000, 
Callender 2000, Earman 2002), the equation governing the unitary evolution of 
the quantum state is time reversal invariant. For interpretations that add something 
to quantum mechanics, this typically means that the resulting theory is time 
reversal invariant too (since it would be odd or even inconsistent to have one part 
of the theory invariant and the other part not). Since the resulting theory is time 
reversal invariant, it is possible to generate the problem of the direction of time 
just as we did with classical mechanics.” Callender, Craig, "Thermodynamic 
Asymmetry in Time", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2011 
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/time-thermo/>.
The fundamental problem referred to here is that since the laws of classical mechanics 
are time symmetric, it is impossible to derive the time asymmetry of classical 
thermodynamics from the underlying laws alone – as Boltzmann and Loschmidt 
understood in C19th, and the Ehrenfests made clear in the early C20th. Something 
extra must be added to get classical thermodynamics. This is widely interpreted as an 
extra ‘fact-like’ condition (or boundary condition in the past). If quantum mechanics 
is time symmetric as well, we have the same problem in quantum thermodynamics. 
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This is the conventional dogma for more than 50 years, but unfortunately for this 
account, quantum mechanics is not time symmetric, and it is shown in Chapter 3 that 
the probabilistic asymmetry of quantum mechanics is exactly what is required to 
explain why quantum thermodynamics is time asymmetric. 
To avoid this conclusion, you must conceal the time asymmetry of quantum 
mechanics. The main tactic is to focus on the deterministic part of quantum mechanics 
(where there is a separate confusion about time reversal of quantum mechanical states 
as well) and avoid discussion of its irreducibly probabilistic laws. Consequently we 
have ‘time asymmetry denial programs’ at prominent institutions. 
I would urge the serious researcher to understand and acknowledge what ordinary 
quantum mechanics says about time first, before going off on a wild goose-chase to 
establish a new ‘deterministic time symmetric’ theory.
The current dominance of the mechanistic ideology.  
The continuing dominance of the static theory of time in main-stream science is 
perfectly represented by the recent Scientific American Special Issue, “A Matter of 
Time”, (2012).  Scientific American publishes these super-prestigious ‘special issues’ 
to present the current ‘state-of-the-art’ of various sciences through summary articles 
by prominent authorities in the field. The editors tell us that “This special issue of 
Scientific American summarizes what science has discovered about how time 
permeate and guides both our physical world and our inner selves”. Remarkably for a 
science journal, it has extensive contributions on the ‘philosophy of time’, by Davies, 
Callender and Musser, three leading neo-positivists. I examine their views on time 
flow and time symmetry. It should be noted that Callender and Musser spend much of 
their articles cheer-leading speculative programs to remove time from physics 
altogether, and make no effort to explain background concepts or issues. The notion 
that this material ‘summarizes what science has discovered about … time’ is as 
misleading as the material itself. 
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Davies’ contribution, with which the volume grandly opens, is dedicated to attacking 
realism about time flow, and repeating his view that it can only be explained as a 
‘subjective’ phenomena, through a reductionist materialist account based on the bloc 
universe. This is the central doctrine of the static theory of time.
“Nothing in known physics corresponds to the flow of time. … The most 
straightforward conclusion is that both past and future are fixed. For this 
reason, physicists prefer to think of time as laid out in its entirety – a 
timescape, analogous to a landscape – with all past and future events located 
there together. Completely absent from this description of nature is anything 
that singles out a privileged, special moment as the present … Indeed, 
physicists insist that time doesn’t flow at all; it merely is. Some philosophers 
argue that the very notion of the passage of time is nonsensical… The time of 
the physicists does not pass or flow. … The concept of flux, after all, refers to 
motion. It makes sense to talk about the movement of a physical object, such 
as an arrow through space, by gauging how its location varies with time. But 
what meaning can be attached to the movement of time itself? …posing the 
simple question ‘How fast does time pass?’ exposes the absurdity of the very 
idea [of the passage off time]. … Although we find it convenient to refer to 
time’s passage in everyday affairs, the notion imparts no new information that 
cannot be conveyed without it.”  P.10.
 “Objectively, past, present and future must be equally real. All of eternity is 
laid out in a four-dimensional block composed of time and the three spatial 
dimensions”. P.11.
 “The arrow of time denotes an asymmetry of the world in time, not an 
asymmetry or flux of time. … talk of the past or the future is as meaningless 
as referring to the up or the down”. P.11.
 “Given that most physical and philosophical analyses of time fail to uncover 
any sign of a temporal flow, we are left with something of a mystery. … 
Nothing other than a conscious observer registers the flow of time. … 
Therefore it appears that the flow of time is subjective, not objective. … This 
illusion cries out for explanation, and that explanation is to be sought in 
psychology, neurophysiology, and maybe linguistics or culture.” P.13. 
(Davies, 2012, “That Mysterious Flow”). 
Davies wrote a useful monograph on “The Physics of Time Asymmetry” some 40 
years ago (Davies, 1973), and he has repeated the same views ever since. While his 
first book espouses many of the neo-positivist errors described here, it still contains a 
good exposition of basic physics, and remains a useful text. But Davies has never 
published any philosophy. He is an interesting science journalist, but has no idea of 
technical philosophy.  The fact that Scientific American presents this neo-positivistic 
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mush as state-of-the-art philosophical reasoning about time for scientists, without any 
balancing views, shows how naïve physicists are about philosophy. 
The second authority is Callender, equally preoccupied with attacking any suggestion 
of time asymmetry or time flow, and supporting the same static theory:
“As you read this sentence, you probably think that this moment – right now – 
is what is happening. … Yet as natural as this way of thinking is, you will not 
find it reflected in science. The equations of physics do not tell us which 
events are occurring right now – they are like a map without the ‘you are here’ 
symbol. The present moment does not exist in them, and therefore neither does 
the flow of time.” P.15. 
“Bolztmann […] reasoned that, because Newton’s laws work equally well 
going backward or forward in time, time has no built-in arrow. Instead he 
proposed that the distinction between past and future is not intrinsic to time 
but arises from asymmetries in how the matter in the universe is organised. 
Although physicists still debate the details of this proposal, Boltzmann 
convincingly plucked away one feature of Newtonian time.” P.16. 
“Although time may not exist at a fundamental level, it may arise at higher 
levels – just as a table feels solid even though it is a swarm of particles 
composed mainly of empty space. Solidity is a collective, or emergent, 
property of the particles. Time, too, could be an emergent property of 
whatever the basic ingredients of the world are.” P.16. (Callender, 2012, “Is 
time an illusion?”). 
According to Callender, science has steadily ‘plucked away’ all the classical features 
of time, especially those that give it any directional structure, including time flow and 
time asymmetry. The argument against time asymmetry from classical physics 
remains ‘convincing’ to him today, although physicists ‘still debate the details’ - with 
no mention that the argument has dramatically changed with quantum mechanics. His 
main speculation is that time itself has some kind of materialist reduction, similar to 
the mechanical reduction of ‘solidity’. But the nature of this ‘reduction’ is left 
absolutely vague, and is completely speculative. Time is a fundamental variable in the 
equations of physics, and is essential in the dimensional analysis and logical 
construction of physical quantities. Solidity is a phenomenal property of objects 
perceived through the senses. How are they comparable? All we are given is a 
metaphor. Callender’s presentation of Bolzmann is also inaccurate and anachronistic. 
Callender, like Davies, is most passionate in his opposition to time flow:
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“Tensers [realists about the distinction between past, present and future] are 
wasting their time trying to find an image of the tensed theory in physics.  
Specific physical theories will be more or less hostile to tenses, but in general 
they will be against tenses so long as there is no clear need for them.  …  From 
this perspective, physics – and science itself—will always be against tenses 
because scientific methodology is always against superfluous pomp.” 
(Callender, “Finding 'Real' Time in Quantum Mechanics”, 2007. Published in 
Einstein, Relativity and Absolute Simultaneity. (Eds) W.L. Craig and Q. 
Smith. Routledge, 2007.  
Again I find it incredible that Scientific American presents such pompous and 
speculative opinion as state-of-the-art philosophical reasoning about time for 
scientists! Following Callender, we have Musser, with “A hole at the heart of 
physics” and “Could time end?”, recycling the same conventional doctrines. 
“The laws of physics contain a time variable, but it fails to capture key aspects 
of time as we live it – notably, the distinction between past and future.” p.22. 
“A second example of philosopher’s contributions concerns the arrow of time 
– the asymmetry of past and future. Many people assume that the arrow is 
explained by the second law of thermodynamics, which states that entropy … 
increases with time. Yet no one can really explain the second law. The leading 
explanation, put forward by … Boltzmann, is probabilistic. … This reasoning, 
however, is symmetric in time… thus the second law is not so much a 
fundamental truth as historical happenstance, perhaps related to events early in 
the big bang. Philosopher Huw Price of the University of Sydney argues that 
almost every attempt to explain time asymmetry suffers from circular 
reasoning – some hidden presumption of time asymmetry. This fallacy also 
distorts how physicists interpret quantum mechanics. Price’s work is an 
example of how philosophers can serve … as the ‘intellectual conscience of 
the practising physicists’. Trained in logical rigor, they are experts at tracking 
down subtle biases.” P. 23.
Forgive me if I shudder at the last declaration. The suggestion that Price serves as ‘the 
intellectual conscience of physicists’, or is ‘trained in logical rigor’ is ludicrous. Price 
is the archetypal verbose anti-realist philosopher, has written copious quantities of 
verbiage about time and semantics without ever giving an equation or a proof or a 
correct formal definition of anything, and he thinks time flow and self are both 
explained as ‘grammatical illusions’:
“But this illusion [time flow] rests in turn on a deeper one; that of a single 
persisting self, self identifying over time. I think that Jenann Ismael is correct 
about the origin of this deeper illusion, in treating it as what she calls a 
‘grammatical illusion’, resting on an indexical ‘abuse of notation’ … The 
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impression of a single thing [the self] reencountered across cycles of self 
presentation is a grammatical illusion.” 
This is the kind of pseudo-explanation we expect from an armchair philosopher. Why 
study physics or cognitive psychology to understand time or the self, when we can 
explain it all as a ‘grammatical illusion’, without ever recording an empirical 
observation or writing an equation? The last ‘philosopher of time’ of such 
monumental tedium was Gale, who wrote a long book recording various English 
language uses of tenses, and called it the philosophy of time. 
But as far as serious claims go, again we have from Musser the assumption that 
fundamental physics is symmetric in time, and the inverted fallacy that physicists who 
have recognised the time asymmetry of quantum mechanics therefore have a distorted 
interpretation of quantum mechanics! And again, where in any of this is there any 
clear statement of the implicit claim that quantum mechanics is time symmetric, or 
any definition of what time symmetry means? 
In his second article in the volume, “Could time end?”, Musser reiterates:
“Physicists have recognised from the mid-19th century that the arrow [of time] 
is a property not of time per se but of matter. Time is inherently bi-directional; 
the arrow we perceive is simply the natural degeneration of matter from order 
to chaos” (Musser, 2012, p.109). 
The same message is repeated in the interview of Carrol by Matson, “What keeps 
time moving forward?”
“But then, when you act like a good scientists or philosopher and try to make 
sense of it, this puzzle arises: the fundamental laws of physics treat the past 
and the future as being exactly the same, whereas the world does not.” (Carrol, 
p. 92). “The answer to why the past is different from the future … is 
intimately connected with the whole universe – with what happened at the big 
bang, with the special condition in our universe when it started” (Carrol, p.92). 
“I wanted to draw attention to this connection between the arrow of time and 
cosmology”. (Carrol, p.92). “What we would think of as ‘how time works’, 
the fact that the past is set in stone while the future can still be altered – is all 
because of entropy.” (p.92). 
19
This is far from novel – it is a reiteration of the conventional doctrine that became 
popular decades ago - that the fundamental laws of physics are time symmetric, and 
the cause of physical time asymmetry is the fact-like boundary condition of low 
entropy in the early universe. No real progress has been made in this explanation by 
the conventional ‘philosophy of physics’ research programs for decades. The same 
essential explanation and same essential problems have barely changed since the 
current cosmological paradigm was established (i.e. the expanding universe theory). 
The last three decades of ‘research’ in conventional philosophy of physics has really 
failed to come up with any new significant explanations or resolutions of anything. 
Musser’s then recites a classic positivist fallacy of reasoning, apparently showing that 
time might ‘disappear’ in a heat-death of the universe in a long-term future:
“You might suppose that duration will continue to make sense in the abstract, 
even if nothing could measure it. But researchers question whether a quantity 
that cannot be measured even in principle really exists. To them, the inability 
to build a clock is a sign that time itself has been stripped of one of its defining 
features. ‘If time is what is measured on a clock and there are no clocks, then 
there is no time’, says philosopher of physics Henrik Zinkernagel”. (Musser, 
P.110. )
The fact that Musser recites this positivistic principle with approval shows how far 
out of touch he is with modern philosophy and logic. If philosophy of science has 
made progress on any single methodological point in the last century, it is to discard 
the false positivist principle that physical reality is defined by the possibility of 
measurement or observation. This fallacy remains popular among physicists, it is true, 
passed down by word of mouth through generations of physics lectures; but it was 
discarded decades ago by serious philosophers of science and logic. 
I conclude here with another quote from Davies: 
“Some researchers, notably the late Nobel laureate chemist Ilya Prigogine, 
have contended that the subtle physics of irreversible processes make the flow 
of time an objective aspect of the world. But I and others argue that it is some 
sort of illusion. After all we do not observe the passage of time. What we 
actually observe is that later states of the world differ from earlier states that 
we still remember. … Nothing other than a conscious observer registers the 
flow of time… Therefore is appears that the flow of time is subjective, not 
objective.” (Davies, 2012, p.13). 
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Davies here refers to one of the great C20th philosopher-scientists to study the 
directionality of time scientifically, and in novel detail, Ilya Prigogine - but Prigogine 
is paid mere lip service. After noting that Prigogine was a realist about time flow, he 
is ignored: none of his views are explained, and Davies’ own opinions are justified as 
the serious scientific view of today, with this logical gem: “But I and others argue 
that it is some sort of illusion. After all we do not observe the passage of time… 
Nothing other than a conscious observer registers the flow of time… Therefore is 
appears that the flow of time is subjective, not objective.” Isn’t registering the flow of 
time the same as observing the passage of time? And we register all sensory 
knowledge consciously, including sight and sound and touch, without making the 
things see and hear and touch ‘subjective’. Davies’ argumentation about this just 
drifts away into dreamland. But how can this kind of opinionated rambling represent 
the leading 20th Century scientific philosophy of time?  
The fleeting mention of Prigogine is the only mention I can find by Davies, Callender 
and Musser in the whole Scientific American Special Issue on Time of any C20th 
writer with an alternative to their view. This is another characteristic of the neo-
positivists in their attacks on alternative views: they rarely cite arguments by their 
critics, or quote arguments against their own views. This is what moves neo-
positivists from scientists to propagandists. The focus on propagandising their own 
selective view of science is central to the neo-positivism, and stems from doctrines and 
attitudes entrenched in the concepts they use to analyse science – including the 
fallacious ‘demarcation’ of ‘sciences’ from ‘pseudo-sciences’, and the evangelisation 
of positivism through prestigious American schools of philosophy of science. 
This 2012 Special Issue on Time is a low point in the entire history of Scientific 
American. It tells us very little about the scientific view of time in physics. The 
journal has allowed itself to be taken over as the mouth-piece for a philosophical 
program, presenting an unbalanced jumble of speculative opinion as ‘scientific 
philosophy’ and ‘scientific orthodoxy’. Scientists who warn against academic 
philosophers have a good point. I do think philosophy itself is vital to science: but 
how do we distinguish real philosophers from programmatic dogmatists? 
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Metaphysical Time: time flow realism.
Neo-positivism, materialism, and the static theory of time. 
I refer to the conventional view as the static theory of time, and it is closely aligned to 
a neo-positivist philosophy. The essence is that: (A) physical time is symmetric, (B) 
physical time is just a dimension of static space-time, and (C) the only legitimate 
knowledge of time is derived from physics. Neo-positivism is a much broader and 
much murkier ideology. Certainly not all adherents of the static theory of time are 
neo-positivists. But neo-positivists are the core support for the static theory, and its 
most dogmatic expressions are generated from the broader neo-positivist vision. 
What I call neo-positivism is a bundle of related doctrines, typified by a materialist 
metaphysics and nominalist ontology, an anti-realist approach to conceptual analysis, 
a positivist-instrumentalist-pragmatist semantics, a mechanistic-reductionist program 
of explanation, an empiricist-inductivist epistemology. The sociological conditioning 
is to display a scientistic attitude, with scientific authority treated as the ultimate 
source of knowledge. Its broader ramifications include nihilism and atheism. 
Captivation by the philosophical vision of neo-positivism is the biggest impediment to 
a serious approach to the subject of time.
Neo-positivism involves a bundle of doctrines, ranging across metaphysics, ontology, 
methodology, epistemology, semantics, sociology and ethics. Like neo-conservatism 
politically, it has some continuity with classical versions of positivism proper (logical 
positivism, logical empiricism, C19th positivism), but in recent decades it has focused 
on a different mixture of doctrines, which are by not consistent or coherent as a 
whole, although I wouldn’t hold that against anyone. The driving characteristic of 
modern neo-positivism is really scientific materialism, which is intermittently realist 
about the existence of physical entities (including unobservable entities like quarks, 
black hole singularities, etc), but generally anti-realist about anything else. The big 
tension in positivism is between the impulse to scientific materialism and 
epistemological subjectivism. Pressed to its logical conclusion, positivism leads to a 
radically subjectivist or idealist metaphysics, and it is thoroughly anti-realist about 
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scientific theories and physical entities. But this radical anti-realism is unacceptable to 
scientists, although anti-realism is entertained as it suits in special cases – notably in 
QM. 
Neo-positivism today is largely dedicated to a reductionist materialist metaphysics, 
and to the claim that the empirical scientific method is the (only) means to obtaining 
real knowledge of the material world. Its doctrines about meaning, knowledge and 
methodology, although derived from positivist epistemology, are pragmatically 
adapted to whatever best justifies scientific materialism at the time. Materialism holds 
that the only real things are actual physical objects or events or processes. 
Nominalism chimes in with the view that only ‘particulars’ exist, and there are no 
‘abstract objects’, such as properties or universals, laws of nature, etc, independent of 
particular objects. Neo-positivism is devoted to the assumption that everything real 
reduces to elementary physical processes, and concludes that any meaningful concept 
must be explicated in such terms. This drives a materialist, mechanistic, reductionist 
program in philosophy. All ‘abstract’ concepts of experience or common language – 
including consciousness, perception, phenomenal properties (colour, texture, etc), 
time flow, ethical value, personal identity, God, emotion, love, beauty, thought, 
intelligence, etc – are regarded as meaningful only insofar as they can be reinterpreted 
as descriptions of physical processes. How do we know what physical processes or 
entities are real? “Through (materialist) sciences of course.” Materialist physics is 
meant to tell us what is real, and materialist neuro-psychology is meant to explain 
how we perceive and materialist behavioural psychology or linguistics is meant to 
explain how we communicate, and so on. 
There are consequently two key motivations that come into play in the neo-positivist 
account of time. The first is to explain away the phenomena features of time, as 
evident through experience, by giving a reductionist explanation, based on a 
materialist account of perception and consciousness itself. The second is to provide a 
metaphysical view of time that supports scientific materialism. 
For examples of the first motivation, we have seen Davies’ view above that: 
“Therefore it appears that the flow of time is subjective, not objective. … This illusion 
cries out for explanation, and that explanation is to be sought in psychology, 
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neurophysiology, and maybe linguistics or culture.” And similarly Callender: 
“Although time may not exist at a fundamental level, it may arise at higher levels – 
just as a table feels solid even though it is a swarm of particles composed mainly of 
empty space. Solidity is a collective, or emergent, property of the particles. Time, too, 
could be an emergent property of whatever the basic ingredients of the world are.” I.e. 
we simply explain away our perceptions of time, without inferring any objective 
properties of time from our experience. (If anyone wonders how we then explain 
away conscious experience in turn, the answer for the neo-positivists is of course it 
has a materialist reduction: consciousness apparently is also an illusion. We must 
wonder if it is a real illusion, or just the illusion of an illusion.) 
But this is hardly satisfactory given that time is taken as one of the fundamental 
variables in fundamental physics (along with space, mass, charge), as well as being a 
fundamental organising principle for experience itself – not just a secondary property 
of material objects, like solidity. We must still deal with the physical reality of time 
somewhere in our account. The second motivation is to describe the physical reality 
of time in a way that supports materialism. Neo-positivists want all of reality to be 
described as a single, actual, physical or material object, with all its parts set out 
transparently, in fixed relations to each other. The paradigm for this vision is the 
blue-print for a physical machine at an instant of time, with its mechanical parts 
transparently related in space. We expect from this image that the machine is defined 
completely by the diagram of its mechanical parts. There seems to be nothing left out 
of the picture – most importantly for the neo-positivist, there are no ‘abstract entities’ 
or ‘spiritual entities’ that we do not see. (Which is why ‘invisible’ entities like force-
fields, properties, space, laws of nature, thoughts, or souls have caused consternation 
for materialists). 
Time of course is the fundamental problem for this view – for it is not simply another 
mechanical entity in the diagram of a machine. It is like an ‘invisible’ dynamic 
principle, bound up with change and causation and laws of nature – threatening the 
simple mechanistic vision of reality. Where is time in the engineering blue-print? The 
static view of time dispenses with this difficulty: time is treated simply as just another 
relation between material events, like spatial relations. We make a space-time 
diagram, and spatialise or materialise temporal relations. 
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This static theory of time is then really a very simple theory of existence. Philosophers 
have wondered for what existence is, why things exist at all, why existence is prone to 
change, whether there are transcendent forms of existence beyond the physical, how 
conscious existence relates to physical existence, and so on. The neo-positivists 
dismiss all such questions: “the world simply exists, with all the facts of its history 
laid out changelessly for all time, as it actually is. It is all reducible to fundamental 
physical events, there is no change, no transcendent realm, no reason, no cause, no 
soul, no consciousness, no abstract entity, no purpose, no value.” And this vision, we 
are assured, is proven by modern science. 
To keep this metaphysical view afloat, neo-positivism lashes together a raft of 
auxiliary philosophical doctrines, about methodology, semantics, explanation and 
epistemology. These are largely just rationalisations to support their primary 
doctrines. The mechanistic vision of metaphysics is reflected in analogous 
mechanistic visions of everything else, including scientific method, scientific 
progress, logic, evidence, truth and semantics. Most typical is an anti-realist paradigm 
of reductionist semantic explanation, which is an extension of reductionist material 
explanation. E.g. in science, the phenomenal substance ‘water’ reduces to a molecular 
substance ‘H2O’. The phenomenal property of ‘hardness’ reduces to a molecular 
property amounting to ‘impenetrability of surfaces’. So far that sounds reasonable – 
as long as we are talking about explaining properties of a physical substance in terms 
of properties of its constituent physical parts. But in the attempt to create a ‘scientific 
philosophy’, the positivists extended this reductionist paradigm to semantics and 
meaning: the meanings of phenomenal concepts must therefore reduce to the 
meanings of atomistic concepts. And to maintain empiricism, they added prescriptions 
that semantic reductions of ‘real (scientific) concepts’ must be based on reductions to 
fundamental ‘observables’ or ‘atomic empirical facts’. This kind of conceptual 
reductionist program goes back to Hume – who famously challenged the concept of 
causation itself, because he could not find the causal relation between events reflected 
in the causal relation between their ‘ideas’. 
It needs to be emphasised that there is a crucial role for operational and instrumental 
definitions of measurements in physics. This was brought to the forefront of C20th 
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methodology by Einstein in the Special Theory of Relativity (defining the frame of 
reference for an observer), and later in quantum mechanics. I will express this in a 
principle that we need to construct objectivised models of measurement. This means 
that instead of simply starting with observations, intuitively interpreted, and inferring 
physical models from them, we start with physical models, and infer the observations 
they imply. This is absolutely necessary in modern physics because observation 
becomes theoretically dependant. It becomes a theoretical exercise to identify what is 
happening in the experimental process of observation. Consequently, we need to 
provide careful theories of what observations are from within our theoretical models – 
which are effectively provided by operational definitions of measurement. Neo-
positivism however tries to turn this into a general theory of operational definitions of 
meaning, leading to various anti-realist semantic theories. But this is a serious 
delusion: they are two completely separate things. Measurements are not meanings 
any more than physical objects are meanings. 
This is where neo-positivism turns into a theoretical fantasy. Realist semantics (or 
formal semantics) is much simpler and direct. When people talk about things 
(properties, perceptions, abstract objects, whatever) we analyse the meaning as if they 
intended to talk about the things they mention. If they talk about water then they mean 
water. If they talk about seeing red then they mean seeing red. If they talk about time, 
or causation, or probability, or numbers, or good, or God, or whatever else – that is 
what they intend to refer to. In realist semantics or logic, we model meanings literally 
as they are intended. We do not reinterpret or prescribe the objects of reference in 
terms of some favoured scientific ontology, or some reduction to operational 
definitions of scientific measurement. 
Anti-realist semantics is always intent on re-modelling meanings in terms of 
something else. If we talk about water but science shows water is really H2O – why 
then the philosopher must show that by ‘water’ we really talk about H2O! If we talk 
about consciousness but our philosophy holds that consciousness is just physical brain 
activity – why then the philosopher must show that by consciousness we really mean 
physical brain states! There are all kinds of failed programs to this effect in 
philosophy – including variations of verificationism, instrumentalism, operationalism, 
and pragmatism. These failed theories of meaning and logic come to the fore when 
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the neo-positivists start defending their metaphysical views, and preaching the 
nonsensicality of traditional metaphysical discussions. We see this constantly in 
attempts to prove that time flow is metaphysically incoherent or impossible or 
meaningless. 
The effect of this is seen not just in scientific metaphysics of course, but in neo-
positivist attacks on traditional metaphysics generally. For the best example, a 
primary question for each of us personally is whether we have a personal identity that 
survives physical death, and the answer deeply affects the meaning of life. The 
answer makes a huge difference to how we behave and feel. Belief in Buddhist 
reincarnation, Judeo-Christian eschatology, Animist spiritualism, or materialist 
annihilation imply different attitudes and behaviours, hopes and values, in this life. It 
is a traditional task of philosophy to explore the implications of these – and our 
conception of time is basic to these questions. Neo-positivists are intent on trivialising 
these questions - dismissing them as pseudo-scientific questions, ‘deflating’ them as 
‘semantic confusions’ - rather than exploring their significance. Their solution is to 
deny that we have a personal identity or even a consciousness at all! The static theory 
of time supports this trivialisation of our normal attitudes towards time and existence, 
by removing the existential significance of past, present and future, and prescribing a 
mechanistic ontology in which there is nothing to identify with ‘personal identity’ or 
‘consciousness’. 
My view is that the questions about personal identity, consciousness and temporal 
existence remain wide open in philosophy and science, and neo-positivism – which is 
more or less to say, the main central tradition of Anglo-American philosophy of 
science in the last fifty years - has been a barren approach, and a hindrance to real 
philosophy. 
Time flow in the metaphysics of physics. 
The question whether to adopt a static ontology or a time flow ontology is the most 
fundamental metaphysical question in modern physics. It is intimately related to the 
concepts of existence, causality and truth that form the heart of naturalistic 
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metaphysics. It is argued here that at the very least this must be maintained as an open 
question in science and philosophy. As illustrated above, leading academics have 
focussed for decades on attacking the concept of time flow, dismissing it as wrong, 
incoherent, and irrelevant to any future development of physics. Neo-positivists want 
to dismiss the very question of time flow once and for all from science, and hear no 
more about it. They would use this ‘scientific result’ as leverage to dismiss time flow 
from philosophy and metaphysics altogether. They want to prescribe a doctrine about 
time that sets the boundaries on acceptable ideas and discussions. 
This doctrinal approach should be rejected in any case. The problems are too complex 
to be decided by the kind of simplistic arguments put forward in the literature today. 
The attacks on time flow are almost all based on fallacies and rhetoric. One is the 
fallacy of time symmetry, and the failure to recognise that physical processes have a 
fundamental time directionality rooted in the laws of nature. The popular 
‘metaphysical’ arguments against time flow reflect fallacies of conceptual analysis, 
and these are important to recognise in philosophy generally. Given these failures of 
analysis, it is impossible to believe that the conventional doctrines can represent any 
kind of mature theory of time. 
The debate cannot be conducted within the assumptions of neo-positivism itself – we 
must widen the conceptual view to allow realist metaphysics to be discussed. Chapter 
4 illustrated another approach to metaphysics, presenting the space of possible worlds 
as a fundamental tool for representing questions and issues and theories. This is 
illustrated by summarising how a variety of metaphysical issues can be explicated in 
this representation. These are issues that have no realistic representation within the 
strictures of neo-positivism. The primary issue treated in detail is the representation of 
time flow, but a wider context is vital, and a realist treatment of concepts such as 
actuality, nomic necessity (laws of nature), higher-order propositions, symmetries, 
consciousness, causation, and many worlds interpretations of quantum mechanics are 
illustrated, as well as past, present and future. 
Most importantly for physics, it is shown here that the two main choices – static 
versus time flow ontology - lead to quite different methods for developing empirical 
theories of physics. This is because they lead directly to two quite different 
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prescriptions for the representational space of physics or physical models. The 
assumption of time flow reveals a class of new realist models that has been 
overlooked in mainstream physics – just like string theory reveals new models that 
were overlooked in mainstream physics for a long time. Until these models are 
properly explored and evaluated, it is impossible to verify whether they are 
successful. Realism about time flow is supported here in a positive way by showing 
the kind of alternative theory it leads to. 
This raises the ongoing question for the future development of physics, rather than 
just for the current interpretation of theories. Most physicists will insist that our 
current theories of physics are the true theories, and rule out any alternative 
development. For these types of academics, the question of alternative theories is not 
an object of interest, it is an object of fear. They are welcome to their views but they 
do not represent the scientific enterprise - unless you want to redefine science as a 
kind of doctrinal bureaucracy. The interest here is in the scientific enterprise, and 
from this perspective, the current theories of physics are not considered finished or 
complete or consistent or even understood yet. 
Time Flow Physics: the theory of the future. 
We finally turn to the implications that time flow would have for physics proper if it 
was reintroduced into modern physics. 
The fundamental dogma of modern physics. 
It is no coincidence that this study begins in Part One with a critical reassessment of a 
cluster of false doctrines about time symmetry. These doctrines go deep into the 
psyche of the modern physics. They do not just reflect false assumptions – they reflect 
poor analysis, and failure to arrive at reliable and meaningful interpretations of 
current physics. They reflect metaphysical doctrines dressed up as ‘scientific results’ 
– and simultaneously a set of analytical methods that conceal and deny the real 
metaphysical dimension of scientific thought. These fundamental errors made in 
understanding the conventional physics of time need to be corrected before moving on 
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to new conceptions. Any new development in physics today must start with basic, 
well-proven, main-stream physics. The material from real physics is very extensive 
and generally accurate in empirical detail, and it provides the primary material we 
have to work with as theorists or philosophers. If we misunderstand the meaning of 
this material, then new theoretical developments will be built on sand. 
The serious problems confronting physics today are traced back to the fact that our 
understanding of the general theories of physics has failed. To move forward, we 
need to examine the failures of these theories – and this means the failures in our 
understanding of them. While more observational data is always nice, this will not 
solve the problems we are now confronted with. We are confronted with conceptual 
failure. The broad framework in which modern physics is prescribed today has two 
major foundations, quantum theory and relativity theory. But these have proved to be 
incompatible, inconsistent with each other, conceptually incomplete, and empirically 
anomalous in many areas. 
Most famously in recent years, cosmology has thrown up ‘dark energy’ and ‘dark 
matter’ - but these mysterious anomalies are just the tip of the iceberg: modern 
physics is fraught with numerous conceptual and empirical inconsistencies and 
anomalies. The outcome has been a flourish of new theorising over the last decades. 
The world of physics is suddenly full of weird and wonderful things – multiple 
universes connected by worm-holes, time running backwards, many-world branching 
models of quantum reality, holographic universes, strings in higher-order space-time 
dimensions, cyclic big-bangs, singularities with infinite energy density, dark matter 
and dark energy, fractal generation of new universes from singularities. These are 
now all serious theoretical ideas (and I should add that they are interesting and 
creative ideas, and their inventors should be appreciated even if they turn out to be 
completely wrong). Yet there is barely any direct observational evidence to confirm 
any of them! How did the conservative and positivistic culture of physics allow this 
menagerie of strange metaphysical speculations to evolve? 
If we look more closely however we see that these ideas are not just wild speculation 
– far from it. They are very prescribed speculation. They are prescribed by the need 
to conform to the two framework theories: quantum mechanics and the General 
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Theory of Relativity (GTR). In fact, most of the weirdest results are simply derived 
from mathematical extrapolations of GTR into extreme or infinite solutions, on the 
naïve assumption that GTR is absolutely true (even when we put infinite quantities 
into it). For example, ordinary physicists a few decades ago would hardly tolerate 
speculation about ‘time travel’ through ‘worm-holes’ joining different universes 
together through ‘black holes’ – but they take it seriously now, because they are told 
that this is the inevitable consequence of applying GTR to regions of space with 
extreme energy densities and infinite quantities. The implication of questioning such 
speculation is to doubt the universal truth of GTR – but such is the passion with which 
this theory is held, it is more acceptable to take its most bizarre physical implications 
as facts, than to question whether the theory is being taken beyond its realm of 
validity. 
Relativistic black holes are now taken as facts of physics – even though normal 
causality breaks down within them, and they require infinite physical quantities, and 
no one has ever observed anything to confirm that the detailed physical properties of  
real ‘black holes’ conform to the theoretical properties described in GTR. Black holes 
are taken as facts purely because the ultimate truth of GTR is assumed, and 
consequently its mathematical extrapolation into the realm of infinite quantities and 
singularities is taken for granted. A similar point can be made about dark matter and 
dark energy: they are inferred by mathematical physicists forcing a theoretical model 
on the universe; yet they have never been independently or directly observed. Indeed, 
despite much searching, physicists cannot identify any known types of particles or 
matter or energy to play the role of dark matter or dark energy. And yet these 
substances are blithely assumed as facts of physics. To me this is where physics 
becomes metaphysics, in the negative sense so criticised by physicists themselves: a 
theoretical dogma that cannot be independently confirmed by evidence.
The primary metaphysical dogmas of modern physics however are not black holes or 
dark matter or dark energy, but the belief that certain symmetries are universal, and 
reflect the ultimate construction of nature itself. As such, these symmetries have no 
deeper explanation, they are taken as axiomatic, considered irrefutable, and provide 
the foundational assumptions on which all theorising is based. This is opposed to the 
normal ‘empiricist’ interpretation of science, where laws represent inductive 
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generalisations, that might one day be found to be only approximate, or have a deeper 
explanation in terms of a more fundamental mechanism. 
Two symmetries are considered particularly problematic here. The first is time 
reversal symmetry, as we have seen. The second is Lorentz symmetry, the darling of 
relativity theory. This is prescribed within physics by the demand to write covariant 
relativistic formulations of fundamental equations in tensor calculus. This symmetry 
is thought to reflect the fundamental properties of space-time itself - just as the 
Euclidean metric and the classical Galilean symmetry was thought to reflect 
fundamental properties of space and time in the era of classical physics. Belief in the 
absolute nature of Lorentz symmetry is the fundamental dogma of modern physics. 
Physicists believe that in this symmetry they have found the absolute truth about 
space-time – not just a fallible ‘empirical law’.
But of course the classical (Galilean) symmetries, also regarded as universal truths in 
the C19th, notoriously proved to be wrong, and were eventually explained as just a 
special limiting case of Lorentz symmetry. How do we know the same fate does not 
lie in store for relativistic mechanics and the Lorentz symmetry? Most physicists 
would probably say that this symmetry has been so carefully tested by experiment, 
that it is known with practical certainty, and we can stop questioning it. But that is a 
delusionary reason. The fact that there are so many anomalies in physics today, so 
many inconsistencies between quantum theory and general relativity, and no unified 
theory, shows that there is something seriously and fundamentally wrong with our 
current theories. There is something wrong at a deep level. The notion that we can 
confirm the absolute truth of the Lorentz symmetry on the basis of specific isolated 
experiments is a mistake. Newtonian gravity was not overthrown and replaced by 
GTR because of specific empirical anomalies, but because the Newtonian theory as a 
whole did not cohere with the rest of physics. After the Special Theory of Relativity, 
Einstein knew that Newtonian gravity ultimately could not be the right theory, despite 
being very well confirmed by the experimental evidence at the time, because it does 
not fit the relativistic framework. We have to treat general theories holistically, not as 
piecemeal propositions. And we cannot test theories purely on their own – we need 
alternative theories to compare against, so we know what kind of anomalies and what 
scale of anomalous effects to look for. Physicists needed GTR to compare Newtonian 
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gravity against, to have an idea of where it could go wrong, and how much it could go 
wrong by. 
The most striking (claimed) implication of relativity theory is also its most bizarre: 
the denial of time flow, based on the denial that there is any physical relation of 
absolute simultaneity. If relativity theory is not fundamental, then this denial is most 
likely to be wrong. The most direct way to check the robustness of the current theory 
is consequently to add the postulate of time flow back into physics directly, and see if 
a viable theory results. This is the starting point for what I have called time flow 
physics. 
If the physicists are right, no plausible alternative empirical theory should be possible. 
If they are wrong, we should find a plausible new type of theory is possible after all . 
Time Flow Physics is a challenge to the assumption that Lorentz symmetry is the 
universal symmetry of nature, as Einstein and Minkowski interpreted it, because if 
there is an absolute frame of simultaneity then the definition of this frame is not 
Lorentz invariant. Now this confronts the deepest metaphysical doctrine of modern 
physics. Physicists often complain about being pestered by cranks in physics, and will 
invariably tell you that the cranks always claim they have disproved Einstein. 
Conversely, any challenge to Einstein’s relativity theory is now likely to be scorned as 
signifying a ‘crank theory’. Yet the scientific method is supposed to challenge such 
assumptions – in theory.
Any successful challenge to relativity theory must be quite subtle, however. For 
example, the most popular ‘proof’ of relativity theory is the prediction that the speed 
of light is a maximum speed of propagation. This has been carefully tested. Its 
confirmation is taken as a proof of the theory as a whole. But an alternative theory 
does not have to contradict this principle - this is only one part of relativity theory. 
The alternative theory proposed here also predicts that the speed of light is universal. 
On this subject, recent experiments to check the speed of neutrinos, by a highly 
respected team of physicists (the OPERA group) are illuminating. This caused a big 
controversy in 2011, and drew hostility from leading physicists, because the results 
indicated that neutrinos travelled faster than light, and this would certainly contradict 
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relativity theory if it was true. This result was ultimately explained by experimental 
error however, and withdraw. It must be stressed that this kind of experimental error 
is perfectly normal in science. It happens all the time. The real failure rate of novel 
experiments in physics would shock people. What is really illuminating is how this 
drew such hostility from other physicists. It threatened their deepest metaphysical 
doctrine: relativity theory and Lorentz symmetry. The suggestion that this could be 
wrong is extremely threatening to physicists. Conversely, now it is corrected, 
physicists can be more dogmatic than ever that relativity theory is universal, but this 
does not follow either. 
I add that the experiment to check the speed of neutrinos was a well-conceived and 
proper investigation at the leading edge of experimental physics. It was the fact that 
the OPERA group reported a result that contradicted the orthodox metaphysics of 
physics that caused such a controversy. But what are you supposed to do if your 
results are anomalous? In theory, you are supposed to report them, and get someone 
else to try to check them for errors, and try to reproduce them independently - and this 
is exactly what the OPERA team did. But perhaps today this is naïve: in practice, 
physicists have to suppress such results on pain of being tarred and feathered.  
However I make no apologies for challenging the orthodox interpretation of physics. I 
am not an academic, and I have no vested interest in anyone else’s dogmas. 
Time flow physics.
The most direct way to explore a theory that challenges the Lorentz symmetry is 
therefore simply to propose that there is a physical relation of absolute simultaneity, 
as defined by ‘the present moment’ in time flow metaphysics, and see if any theory of 
physics makes sense on this assumption. I have shown how a coherent theory with this 
assumption can be developed. The most surprising thing is that it leads directly to a 
multi-dimensional spatial model. It is argued here that time flow allows a class of 
physical models that are (a) highly realistic, but (b) not representable in the static 
view. Time flow should remain a central concept of physics at least, because it allows 
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the representation of a wider class of realistic physical models than can otherwise be 
conceived. 
In fact a time flow theory provides a real contrast of explanations and insights into 
many problems in conventional physics and cosmology – even if this turns out to be 
empirically wrong, it should be evaluated. The bottom line is that if time flow is real, 
then the current theories can never succeed in explaining the key phenomena of 
cosmology, gravity and particle physics. If we don’t look at alternative explanations, 
how will we ever know? Theories in science are not bad or worthless or cranky 
simply because they are wrong. Almost all the best theories we have ever had in 
physics have been wrong.
This new theory has a simple ontology with very powerful symmetries. Symmetries 
remain the key feature, driving the conception of the model, and determining the form 
of equations within tight constraints. However the symmetries are not the same as 
those physicists currently expect and demand and prescribe as physical symmetries 
for future theoretical developments. There are two profound differences in 
symmetries, both to do with time. The first is a failure of time reversal symmetry, 
which physicists currently claim to be a deep and guiding principle of physics. The 
second is the replacement of ordinary covariance, or Lorentz symmetry, with 
something more fundamental. 
This will sound shocking to main-stream physicists: how could you make a realistic 
theory without such symmetries? And yet of course there has to be some shocking 
difference for it to be a new theory at all! And there are two very good explanations 
for the failure of these symmetries. (A) Time reversal symmetry actually does not 
hold for current theories of physics either! The notion that it is a real symmetry of 
physics, or a real symmetry of time, is a myth. This is what is shown in Part 1. So in 
fact, the new theory does not differ from our current theories in this respect – but the 
explicit recognition that it is time asymmetric has a powerful effect in conceptualising 
the theory. (B) Ordinary covariance or Lorentz symmetry is replaced with a more 
powerful symmetry, that generates the appearance of a covariant theory in the normal 
realm of phenomena – just like Lorentz symmetry approximates to classical Galilean 
symmetry at low velocity and energy, or the curved space-time of General Relativity 
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approximates to the flat space-time of Special Relativity at low gravity. But Lorentz 
symmetry is ultimately not fundamental, it is generated from the mechanical 
symmetries of a more fundamental multi-dimensional model of space. 
This is the point where the new theory really departs from current expectations – it 
falls outside the ability of current physicists to represent, because they have chosen to 
prescribe the representational space for theories of physics. This is effectively done 
by prescribing a covariant tensorial formulation for the equations of physics. This 
choice of representation really prescribes a metaphysical belief in a certain symmetry. 
This prescription occurs precisely through the rejection of time flow in modern 
physics, and the adoption of the static space-time manifold. But before tackling this, 
we need to clarify the more mundane issues about time symmetry and directionality in 
the ordinary physics of time. 
These footnotes have only incomplete references. References provided in the 
book version. 
